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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction of this Court is invoked as an appeal upon a final 
order from the United States District Court for the District of 
Progress.  28 U.S.C. § 1291 (2006).  The jurisdiction of the district 
court was appropriate under federal question jurisdiction as 
authorized under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2006).  The original 
jurisdiction falls under federal question jurisdiction because the 
controversy surrounds the Clean Water Act (“CWA” or “Statute”), 
33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (2000).  The notice of appeal was filed in a 
timely manner.  Fed. R. App. P. 4(a); (R. at 5). 
 
 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
I.  Whether Bonhomme, a French nationalist without 
particularized injury, is the real party in interest under Fed. R. 
Civ. P. 17 to bring suit against Maleau for violating the CWA. 
II.  Whether Bonhomme is a “citizen” under 33 U.S.C. § 
1365(g), who may bring suit against Maleau. 
III. Whether Maleau’s mining waste piles are “point sources” 
under the CWA, 33 U.S.C. § 1362(12), (14). 
IV. Whether Ditch C-1, a seasonal irrigation ditch that 
discharges into a water that is not navigable-in-fact, is a 
navigable water/water of the United States under the CWA, 33 
U.S.C. § 1362(7), (14). 
V. Whether Reedy Creek, a stream that is not navigable-in-
fact or a channel in interstate commerce, is a navigable 
water/water of the United States under the CWA, 33 U.S.C. § 
1362(7), (12). 
VI. Whether Bonhomme violates the CWA by adding arsenic 
to Reedy Creek through a culvert on his property even if 
Bonhomme is not the but-for cause of the presence of arsenic in 
Ditch C-1. 
2http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelroc/vol5/iss1/5
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Appellee Jacques Bonhomme (“Bonhomme”), a French 
national living in the State of Progress and working for Precious 
Minerals International, Inc., commenced this action against 
Maleau under the citizen suit provision of the CWA, 33 U.S.C. § 
1365.  (R. at 4).  Bonhomme alleges that Maleau violates the 
CWA because waste from Maleau’s business contaminates Ditch 
C-1 with arsenic, eventually discharging into Reedy Creek, an 
alleged interstate, navigable water.  (R. at 5). 
 The State of Progress (“Progress”) joined this action by 
filing a citizen suit against Bonhomme, alleging that Bonhomme 
was in violation of the CWA because arsenic is entering Reedy 
Creek through a culvert on Bonhomme’s property.  Id.  Maleau 
subsequently intervened in Progress’s action against Bonhomme 
under 33 U.S.C. § 1365(b)(1)(B).  Id.  The cases were consolidated 
as Bonhomme v. Maleau. Id. 
The defendant in each suit filed motions to dismiss.  Id.  The 
district court dismissed Bonhomme’s suit, holding that he was not 
a proper plaintiff.  (R. at 10).  The district court held: 
(1)  Bonhomme is not a real party in interest according to Fed. R. 
Civ. P. 17; 
(2)  Bonhomme is not a “citizen” entitled to file a citizen suit 
under the CWA, § 33 U.S.C. 
1365(g); 
(3)  Maleau’s mining waste piles are not “point sources” under the 
CWA, 33 U.S.C. § 1265(12), (14); 
(4)  Ditch C-1 is not a navigable water because it is a point 
source; 
(5)  Bonhomme violates the CWA by discharging pollutants into 
Reedy Creek through his culvert; 
(6)  Reedy Creek is a water of the United States under the CWA, 
33 U.S.C. § 1362(7), (12). 
(R. at 1-2). 
Bonhomme appeals the district court’s decision with respect 
to the first four issues.  Progress appeals the district court’s 
3
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decision on issue (4).  Maleau appeals the district court’s decision 
for issue (6). 
 
 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Jacques Bonhomme is a French citizen residing in the United 
States where he serves as President of Precious Minerals 
International, Inc. (“PMI”), an international gold mining and 
extraction business.  Bonhomme is a member of the PMI Board of 
Directors, President, and owns the largest proportion of its stock 
as a three percent shareholder.  Bonhomme owns a hunting lodge 
in Lincoln County, Progress, where he hosts hunting parties for 
PMI clients and associates. 
Shifty Maleau owns a nearby gold mining operation in 
Lincoln County that directly competes with PMI.  Maleau 
transports waste materials generated by the operation to his 
other property in neighboring Jefferson County, and places them 
in piles on his land.  During periods of precipitation, rainwater 
flows through the piles and forms naturally occurring channels in 
the soil, which eventually deposit into a seasonal drainage ditch 
running through his property known as Ditch C-1. 
Previous landowners constructed Ditch C-1 to sufficiently 
drain their properties for agricultural uses.  The ditch runs 
through several neighboring land parcels and contains drained 
groundwater derived from saturated soil and rainwater runoff.  
PMI facilitated testing of Ditch C-1 that indicates the presence of 
the pollutant arsenic.  The ditch ultimately discharges the 
contaminated water through a culvert on Bonhomme’s property 
into Reedy Creek, three miles from Maleau’s land. 
Reedy Creek serves commercial and agricultural purposes in 
both Progress and neighboring New Union.  It is neither 
navigable-in-fact nor used for transporting commercial goods.  
The creek ends in a wetlands area primarily owned and 
maintained by the United States Fish and Wildlife Service known 
as Wildman Marsh.  PMI’s data indicates the existence of arsenic 
in both the creek and the marsh. 
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelroc/vol5/iss1/5
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Bonhomme’s property partially fronts Wildman Marsh, 
which he uses during his corporate hunting events.  However, 
recently both PMI’s profitability and the frequency of 
Bonhomme’s parties have declined. 
 
 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Bonhomme lacks standing in this matter because he is not 
the real party in interest.  Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure (Fed. R. Civ. P.), 17(a), defendants should not be 
subjected to double liability if sued by third parties not properly 
joined in suits where those third parties are real parties in 
interest.  In the instant case, PMI is the real party in interest, for 
which Bonhomme is a front.  PMI, rather than Bonhomme, 
finances the sampling and analysis of Ditch C-1, Reedy Creek, 
and Wildman Marsh.  It additionally pays all of Bonhomme’s 
attorney and expert witness fees.  Lastly, PMI is the true 
beneficiary of Bonhomme’s hunting events, many of which 
entertain corporate clients and associates.  Bonhomme therefore 
does not have a direct injury or interest as required under the 
CWA to bring a citizen suit. 
The citizen suit provision of the CWA applies exclusively to 
United States citizens and Bonhomme consequently lacks 
standing as a French national.  Congress did not authorize 
foreign citizens to bring claims under the CWA.  Rather, it 
notably excluded foreign citizens from the definition of “person” in 
the context of citizen suits, while incorporating juridical entities 
that hold vested authority and domestic interests such as the 
State, municipalities, corporations, and partnerships.  Nowhere 
in the CWA does Congress authorize litigation by foreign citizens. 
Maleau is not liable as a polluter under the CWA because his 
waste piles are not “point sources” pursuant to 33 U.S.C. § 
1362(14).  The Statute defines point sources as “discernible, 
defined, discrete conveyance[s]” and provides a representative list 
of structures that meet the definition, all of which connote human 
made discharge or drainage systems.  The Statute’s plain 
5
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language and supporting case law demonstrate that gravity-
formed soil channels depositing rainwater runoff from Maleau’s 
waste piles into Ditch C-1 do not constitute a discrete conveyance, 
therefore alleviating Maleau of CWA liability. 
Ditch C-1 does not meet the statutory definition of “navigable 
water” and therefore falls outside of the CWA’s jurisdiction.  
Congress specifically intended to preserve traditional state 
powers over land use planning and water resource management.  
While Congress strove to clean the nation’s waters, it did not 
intend to strip the States’ authority over their own waterways.  
Accordingly, Congress limited the federal government’s 
jurisdiction over navigable waters. Courts have acknowledged 
that while the definition of “navigable” for purposes of the CWA 
surpasses a traditional understanding of the word, its 
conventional meaning is nonetheless significant.  Thus, for 
federal jurisdiction over water that is not navigable-in-fact, the 
Supreme Court held that the isolated water must have a 
significant nexus or a continuous surface connection to a 
navigable-in-fact water.  Ditch C-1 does not qualify as navigable 
water because it is not itself navigable-in-fact and it does not 
satisfy the crucial element of connectivity to a navigable-in-fact 
water.  Ditch C-1 is a man-made drainage ditch that terminates 
into Reedy Creek.  Because Reedy Creek is a non-navigable 
water, CWA jurisdiction does not extent to Ditch C-1. 
Ready Creek is neither a traditionally navigable water nor 
attached to a navigable-in-fact water body, and is therefore 
beyond the reach of the CWA.  Reedy Creek is not alleged to be 
navigable-in-fact or capable of becoming navigable with 
reasonable improvements.  Reedy Creek is consequently not a 
traditionally navigable water meaning it must connect to a 
traditionally navigable-in-fact water for federal jurisdiction to 
attach.  Reedy Creek terminates into Wildman Marsh, an area 
that does not qualify as a traditionally navigable water.  
Although Reedy Creek crosses state lines and may affect 
interstate commerce, Commerce Clause powers are extended over 
navigable waters through the channels of the interstate 
commerce prong.  Reedy Creek is not used as an interstate 
channel, which makes jurisdiction based on Commerce Clause 
authority unjustified. 
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelroc/vol5/iss1/5
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If this Court determines that Reedy Creek is a navigable 
water, Bonhomme is consequently liable under the CWA.  The 
Statute requires a federally issued National Pollutant Discharge 
Elimination System (“NPDES”) permit for discharging a 
pollutant into a navigable water via a point source.  Contrary to 
Bonhomme’s claim, causation is not contemplated by this 
provision of the CWA, making his assertion that Maleau is the 
but-for cause of the arsenic contamination irrelevant.  
Bonhomme’s ownership of the point source implicates his liability 
under the CWA. 
In light of the forgoing, the district court’s dismissal of 
Bonhomme’s claims on the issues of standing and CWA liability 
should be affirmed and the district court’s determination of Reedy 
Creek as a navigable water under the CWA should be reversed. 
 
 
STATEMENT OF APPELLATE STANDARD 
OF REVIEW 
A motion to dismiss is properly granted when a plaintiff 
alleges facts that, accepted as true, fail to state a claim for which 
relief can be granted.  Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).  To avoid dismissal, 
the complaint’s factual allegations must comprise more than 
labels and conclusions or a simple recitation of the cause of 
action’s elements, and the right to relief must rise above a 
speculative level.  Bell A. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 545 
(2007). 
Courts of Appeals review motion to dismiss determinations 
de novo, in which legal issues are reconsidered. Findings of fact 
by the district court are reviewed for “clear error.”  United States 
v. Ziskin, 360 F.3d 934, 942 (9th Cir. 2003). 
 
 
 
 
 
7
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ARGUMENT 
I. THIS COURT SHOULD UPHOLD THE DISTRICT 
COURT’S RULING THAT BONHOMME IS NOT 
THE REAL PARTY IN INTEREST UNDER FED. R. 
CIV. P. 17(A) BECAUSE HE RESTS HIS CLAIM ON 
THE INTERST OF A THIRD PARTY. 
 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 17(a)(1) states, “An action must be prosecuted 
in the name of the real party in interest.”  The purpose of Rule 
17(a) is to protect a defendant against a subsequent claim, 
ensuring the benefit of res judicata.  See Curtis Lumber Co. v. 
Louisiana Pac. Corp., 618 F.3d 762, 771 (8th Cir. 2010) (finding 
that the real-party-in-interest rule does not bar suit because the 
third party in question suffered no injury necessary to make the 
defendant at risk of being doubly liable); Marina Mgmt. Servs., 
Inc. v. Vessel My Girls, 202 F.3d 315, 318-19 (D.C. Cir. 2000) 
(reversing a denial of a motion to dismiss because the district 
court’s judgment does not protect the defendant against a 
subsequent claim by a third party, suggesting the plaintiff is not 
the interested party under Rule 17(a)); United HealthCare Corp. 
v. Am. Trade Ins. Co., Ltd., 88 F.3d 563, 569 (8th Cir. 1996) 
(highlighting that Rule 17(a) is for the benefit of the defendant).  
A plaintiff lacks the prudential standing to bring suit if he “rest[s] 
his claim to relief on the legal rights or interests of third parties.”  
Lans v. Digital Equip. Corp., 252 F.3d 1320, 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2001) 
(quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975)). 
The primary purpose of Rule 17(a) is to “protect the 
defendant against a subsequent action by the party actually 
entitled to recover.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 17(a), Advisory Committee 
Note.  In Curtis Lumber, Curtis Lumber Company (“Curtis 
Lumber”) sold its siding materials by taking advantage of a 
promotional rebate offered by the Louisiana Pacific Corporation 
(“LP”), a national manufacturer of building materials.  618 F.3d 
at 767.  Upon discovering additional requirements attaching to 
the rebate, Curtis Lumber’s customers cancelled their orders and 
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelroc/vol5/iss1/5
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refused to pay.  Id.  Curtis Lumber sued based on lost profits, and 
LP attempted to bar suit through Rule 17(a).  Id. at 769.  The 
court decided that Curtis Lumber’s individual customers did not 
suffer an injury in fact, which meant there was not a risk of 
subsequent claims being filed against LP.  Id. at 771.  
Accordingly, the court found Curtis Lumber to be the real party 
in interest under Rule 17(a).  Id. 
In Marina Management, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals 
questioned whether Marina Management Services, Inc. (“Marina 
Management”), acting as an agent, had the right to sue the 
defendant on behalf of MIF Realty, L.P. (“MIF Realty”).  202 F.3d 
at 318.  The court ultimately reversed the denial of the 
defendant’s motion to dismiss because there were no protections 
from a subsequent claim by MIF Realty for the money that 
Marina Management sought to recover, thus in “noncompliance 
with Rule 17(a).”  Id. at 319. 
Rule 17(a) bars Bonhomme from bringing suit against 
Maleau because he is not the real party in interest, which would 
leave Maleau open to subsequent claims.  PMI is the real party in 
interest in the current matter.  PMI has financed all of 
Bonhomme’s attorney and expert fees associated with this case.  
(R. at 7).  PMI, not Bonhomme, funded the samples and analyses 
supporting Bonhomme’s contention that the arsenic in Ditch C-1, 
Reedy Creek, and Wildman originated on from Maleau’s property.  
Id.  If this Court allows Bonhomme’s claim to proceed, Maleau 
would be subject to further claims brought by PMI, which is 
contrary to the purpose of Rule 17(a).  Unlike the facts in Curtis 
Lumber, where the third-party customers of Curtis Lumber had 
no injury, PMI has a very real injury in the form of lost profits, 
which leaves Maleau open to duplicate liability.  Bonhomme 
claims an injury of hosting six less hunting parties per year than 
he previously held.  (R. at 6).  Yet, the Record states he “is afraid 
to use the marsh for his hunting parties,” which is not actually 
owned by Bonhomme.  Id.  Bonhomme only owns the property 
adjacent to the marsh, including his hunting lodge, where he does 
not reside year-round, making the claim of injury tenuous.  Id.  
Additionally, losing six opportunities to host hunting parties is 
not a direct injury to Bonhomme because these events serve the 
business interests of PMI.  See (R. at 6).  Moreover, the 
9
  
124 PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW ONLINE [Vol.  5 
 
connection between Reedy Creek and Bonhomme’s ability to 
throw lavish parties for corporate executives and prospective 
business associates is likely a spurious correlation.  See Id.  
Rather, the decrease in hunting parties is more likely attributed 
to a declining economy that mirrors PMI’s loss in profitability.  
PMI is the chief financier for all evidence and services related to 
Bonhomme’s claim because of its deep-rooted financial stake in 
the matter, which makes PMI the real party in interest rather 
than Bonhomme. 
Where the court in Curtis Lumber did not favor the use of 
Rule 17(a) as a bar to bringing suit, this Court should 
acknowledge the clear difference between a wealthy company 
such as PMI and Curtis Lumber customers who simply decided 
not to make a purchase.  Similar to the circumstances 
surrounding Marina Management, where the court found Marina 
Management to be an illegitimate agent for MIF Realty’s real 
interest, Bonhomme, having no real injury, is not the real party 
in interest.  Bonhomme serves on the Board of Directors and as 
President of PMI.  (R. at 6-7). However, just as in Marina 
Management, Bonhomme, as an agent is not expressly given the 
right to sue on behalf of PMI.  The possibility of Maleau being 
sued by Bonhomme, and then again by PMI is precisely what 
Rule 17(a) is designed to prevent.  Maleau properly raised in a 
timely manner PMI’s interest in his answer to Bonhomme’s 
complaint in the lower court.  (R. at 7).  This Court should 
following Fed. R. Civ. P. 17(a) and affirm the dismissal of 
Bonhomme’s suit because Maleau had given a reasonable amount 
of time for PMI to rightfully join the suit.  Id.  Because 
Bonhomme is not the real party in interest and PMI can no 
longer join the suit this Court should affirm lower court’s 
dismissal of the Bonhomme’s claims on Rule 17(a) grounds. 
II. THIS COURT SHOULD UPHOLD THE DISTRICT 
COURT’S RULING THAT BONHOMME IS NOT A 
“CITIZEN” UNDER § 33 U.S.C. 1365(G). 
The CWA authorizes any “citizen” to maintain suit against 
violations of the Statute by using the citizen suit provision.  33 
U.S.C. §1365.  Citizen is defined as, “a person or persons having 
an interest which is or may be adversely affected.”  Id.  “Person” 
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelroc/vol5/iss1/5
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is further defined as individuals, corporations, partnerships, 
government, entities, etc.  33 U.S.C. §§ 1365(g), 1362(5).  Foreign 
nationals are not expressly given authorization to commence 
citizen suits under the CWA.  Id.  The Supreme Court held that 
by broadening the term “navigable waters” as “waters of the 
United States,” Congress did not deprive the term “navigable” of 
all meaning.  Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook Cnty v. U.S. Army 
Corps of Eng’rs, 531 U.S. 159, 172 (2001) (commonly referred to 
as the SWANCC case); 33 U.S.C. §1362; (R at 8).  “Similarly, the 
CWA’s definition of the narrow concept of a ‘citizen’ of the United 
States as the broader concept of a ‘person,’ does not deprive 
‘citizen’ of its meaning.”  (R. at 8).  The entities listed, including 
corporations, partnerships, States, municipalities, etc. are used to 
define “persons.”  33 U.S.C. § 1362(5).  If Congress intended to 
broaden the definition of citizen beyond that of American 
citizenship and domestic entities in the juridical form, it would 
have expressly written the section of the CWA as such. 
The court, in Corrosion Proof Fittings v. EPA, found that 
foreign entities do not have standing to challenge the EPA’s 
actions under TSCA.  947 F.2d 1201, 1210-11 (5th Cir. 1991).  
The Fifth Circuit cites Clarke v. Securities Industry Ass’n, in its 
determination that it was unlikely foreign entities were “intended 
[by Congress] to be relied upon to challenge agency disregard of 
the law.”  479 U.S. 388, 399 (1987).  If the Fifth Circuit believes 
foreign entities are not able to challenge the EPA on its decision-
making to enforce environmental statutes like TSCA, then surely 
the CWA, 33 U.S.C. § 1365(g), in its definition of “citizen” as “any 
person or persons having an interest,” excludes foreign nationals.  
In Corrosion Proof Fittings, Canadian petitioners interpreted 
“any person” to mean anyone who could arrange transportation to 
the courthouse.  947 F.2d at 1209.  The court denied the 
petitioners’ standing.  Id. at 1211.  The court further stated, 
“[P]arties that Congress specifically did not intend to participate 
in, or benefit from, an administrative decision have no right to 
challenge the legitimacy of that decision.”  Id. at 1210. 
A reasonable application of SWANCC would hold that foreign 
nationals are not given standing under the CWA to bring a 
citizen suit because such a holding would deprive “citizen” of all 
import.  Accordingly, Bonhomme, as a foreign national of France, 
11
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does not have standing to bring suit against Maleau under the 
CWA.  33 U.S.C. §§ 1365(g), 1362(5); (R. at 8).  Further, Corrosion 
Proof Fittings supports this determination, albeit for another 
United States environmental statute.  This Court should affirm 
the lower’s court’s decision to bar Bonhomme’s suit because he 
lacks standing to bring a citizen suit under the CWA.  33 U.S.C. 
§§ 1365(g), 1362(5). 
III.  THIS COURT SHOULD UPHOLD THE DISTRICT 
COURT’S RULING THAT MALEAU’S WASTE 
PILES ARE NOT POINT SOURCES UNDER 33 
U.S.C. § 1262(14) BECAUSE WASTE PILES ARE 
NOT A DISCERNIBLE, CONFINED, OR DISCRETE 
CONVEYANCE. 
The district court properly dismissed Bonhomme’s claim that 
Maleau’s waste piles constitute point sources under the CWA.  
The Statute defines “point source” as “any discernible, confined 
and discrete conveyance, including but not limited to any pipe, 
ditch, channel, tunnel, conduit, well, discrete fissure, container, 
rolling stock, concentrated animal feeding operation, or vessel or 
other floating aircraft, from which pollutants are or may be 
discharged.”  33 U.S.C. § 1362(14).  Point sources from which 
pollutants discharge into “navigable waters” require a permit 
issued by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) 
under the NPDES.  33 U.S.C. § 1341(a)(1).  Though the statutory 
list is not exhaustive, the court may not indiscriminately add 
items to it.  Reading “waste piles” into the provision would 
require an unjustified finding that they are analogous to the 
discrete conveyances enumerated.  See Barnhart v. Peabody Coal 
Co., 537 U.S. 149, 168 (2003).  As the district court properly 
determined, the plain language of the CWA and relevant case law 
demonstrate that waste piles do not constitute point sources, thus 
alleviating Maleau of liability under the Statute.  Bonhomme’s 
claim on this issue was therefore justly dismissed and should be 
affirmed by this Court. 
Bonhomme incorrectly asserts that Maleau’s piles of 
overburden and slag constitute a point source pursuant to the 
CWA.  Overburden is characterized as the worthless layer of soil 
and rock removed by miners to gain access to ores and minerals 
12http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelroc/vol5/iss1/5
  
2015] BEST BRIEF: MALEAU 127 
 
below the surface.  Friends of Santa Fe County v. LAC Minerals, 
Inc., 892 F. Supp. 1333, 1337-38 (D.N.M. 1995).  Slag is a similar 
stony byproduct of the smelting process.  A & W Smelter and 
Refiners, Inc. v. Clinton, 146 F.3d 1107, 1109 (9th Cir. 1998).  The 
district court dismissed Bonhomme’s claim based on the CWA’s 
plain language, emphasizing that none of the point source 
examples enumerated in the Statute remotely resemble waste 
piles of such materials, and concluded “piles are not normally 
considered to be conveyances.”  (R at 9).  The district court’s 
reasoning is supported by the Second Circuit’s ruling in U.S. v. 
Plaza Health Labs., Inc., establishing that the defining terms and 
examples given in the Statute (“pipe, ditch, channel, tunnel, 
conduit, well, discrete fissure, etc.”) conjure images of physical 
structures and systematic conveyances delivering pollutants from 
industrial sources to navigable waterways.  3 F.3d 643, 646 (2d 
Cir. 1993).  (“Although by its terms, the definition of ‘point source’ 
is nonexclusive, the words used to define the term and examples 
given . . . evoke images of physical structures and 
instrumentalities that systematically act as a means of conveying 
pollutants from an industrial source to a navigable waterways”) 
(emphasis added).  Id.  By contrast, Maleau’s waste piles do not 
comprise a pollution delivery system designed to discharge into a 
navigable waterway. 
 In Greater Yellowstone Coal v. Lewis, the Ninth Circuit 
held that regarding mining operations, Congress intended 
precipitation runoff involving pollutants to be considered 
nonpoint sources.  628 F.3d 1143, 1152 (9th Cir. 2010).  There the 
court established that merely asserting a hydrologic connection 
between contaminated groundwater and surface waters is 
insufficient to warrant point source classification.  Such claims 
must initially establish the existence of a point source to which 
pollutants can be attributed, and that unless groundwater-
transported pollution is traceable to a point source such as a 
tank, pipeline, ditch or other such conveyance, it is not subject to 
NPDES permitting requirements.  Id.  Lewis further established 
that a “storm water drainage system” is precisely the type of 
collection or channeling intended for regulation by the CWA.  Id.  
at 1152-53.  Maleau’s property lacks the type of pollution 
drainage scheme contemplated in Lewis.  Unlike the examples 
enumerated by the court, pollution from his waste piles is not 
13
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discharged by a human made conveyance and should therefore be 
classified as a nonpoint source. 
Further bolstering Maleau’s assertion that his waste piles 
are nonpoint sources pursuant to the CWA is the Government’s 
definition of nonpoint source pollution (“NPS”), characterized by 
EPA as that which is “caused by rainfall or snowmelt moving over 
and through the ground.”  EPA’s Polluted Brochure EPA-841-F-
94-005, (1994), available at http://www.epa.gov 
/owow/nps/qa.html.  EPA further states, “as the runoff moves, 
it picks up and carries away natural and human-made pollutants 
finally depositing them into lakes, rivers, wetlands, coastal 
waters, and even our underground sources of drinking water.”  Id.  
EPA’s representation of nonpoint source pollution mirrors the 
situation occurring on Maleau’s property in Lincoln County, 
where precipitation flows through his discarded waste via 
naturally occurring channels in the soil eventually terminating at 
Ditch C-1. 
 Bonhomme’s reliance on Sierra Club v. Abston Cont. Co., 
Inc. is misplaced because the decision effectuates a circuit split 
that is not supported by the weight of authority.  620 F.2d 41 (5th 
Cir. 1980).  The Fifth Circuit’s designation of waste piles in the 
mining context as a point source is contrary to rulings mandating 
that mining waste constitutes a point source only when 
discharged from a source designed to collect or convey storm 
water.  See Consol. Coal Co. v. Costle, 604 F.2d 239, 249 (4th Cir. 
1979) (stating the definition of point source excludes water that 
has not been collected and channeled) (rev’d on other grounds); 
Appalachian Power Co. v. Train, 545 F.2d 1351, 1373 (4th Cir. 
1976) (finding that though the statutory definition is somewhat 
broad it does not include uncollected and unchanneled rain water 
runoff). 
 Lastly, the final element of the CWA’s point source 
definition supports both the district court’s determination that 
Maleau’s waste piles do not violate the Statute and Bonhomme’s 
invalid dependence on Abston.  In the current matter, gravity-
formed channels discharge into Ditch C-1, which (as established 
in the following section) does not qualify as a navigable water or a 
water of the United States under the Statute.  Bonhomme’s 
reliance on Abston in attempting to overcome the statutory 
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language and establish Maleau’s waste piles as point sources is 
invalid because the piles at issue in Abston discharged pollutants 
into a navigable water.  620 F.2d at 44.  The Abston court 
specified that discharge from waste piles constitutes a point 
source if channeled into a navigable water through “ditches, 
gullies and similar conveyances.”  Id.  Maleau’s waste piles 
discharge into Ditch C-1, which is not a navigable water, as 
evidenced by the Abston court’s classification of ditches as 
potential point sources.  Id.  Maleau’s waste piles are therefore 
not a point source pursuant to the CWA because they discharge 
into Ditch C-1, which does not qualify as a navigable water under 
the Statute. 
The plain language of the CWA and judicial interpretation of 
its application clearly indicate that Maleau’s waste piles do 
constitute a point source under the Statute.  Because Maleau’s 
waste piles are not within the CWA’s jurisdiction this court 
should uphold the district court’s ruling on this issue. 
IV.   THIS COURT SHOULD UPHOLD THE DISTRICT 
COURT’S RULING THAT DITCH C-1 DOES NOT 
QUALIFY AS A NAVIGABLE WATER OR A WATER 
OF THE UNITED STATES UNDER 33 U.S.C. § 
1362(7), (12) BECAUSE DITCH C-1 DOES NOT 
HAVE A CONTINUOUS SURFACE CONNECTION 
OR A SIGNIFICANT NEXUS TO A NAVIGABLE-IN-
FACT WATER. 
The CWA intends to preserve traditional State power to 
regulate local pollution.  The Statute specifically called for 
“[c]ongressional recognition, preservation, and protection of [the] 
primary responsibilities and rights of [the] States.”  33 U.S.C. § 
1251(b).  As a result, the federal government’s jurisdiction over 
water is limited to navigable waters, which the Statute defines as 
“waters of the United States, including the territorial seas.”  Id.  § 
1362(7). 
The definitional ambiguity required both EPA to promulgate 
regulations and courts to further clarify the agency’s jurisdiction.  
The traditional definition of navigable waters was set forth in 
United States v. Appalachia Electric Power Co., which defined 
navigable waters as those having been used for waterborne 
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transportation or could be so used with reasonable improvements.  
311 U.S. 377, 408 (1940).  EPA vastly expanded the original 
understanding of “navigable waters” by defining “waters of the 
United States” to include such waters as all tributaries to 
navigable waters, all interstate waters, and all inter and 
intrastate waters that affect interstate commerce.  40 C.F.R. § 
122.2 (2011). 
While EPA has continuously extended its jurisdiction of 
“navigable waters” and “waters of the United States,” the 
Supreme Court clearly demonstrates by shaping federal authority 
over navigable waters in recent cases that EPA’s jurisdiction 
under the CWA is not limitless.  See Rapanos v. United States, 
547 U.S. 715, 810 (2006) (a plurality decision resulting in two 
tests for determining when isolated wetlands fall under the 
jurisdiction of the CWA); Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook 
County v. United States Army Corps of Eng’rs, 531 U.S. 159, 174 
(2001) (holding that navigable waters did not include isolated 
ponds and wetlands used as a habitat by migratory birds crossing 
state lines); and United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 
474 U.S. 121, 135 (1985) (holding that federal CWA jurisdiction 
over wetlands extends only to those wetlands adjacent to 
traditionally navigable waters).  Following these precedential 
decisions, neither Ditch C-1 nor Reedy Creek qualify as navigable 
waters or waters of the United States.  Thus, Maleau is not liable 
for illegal discharges into either water. 
Non-navigable ditches with regularly flowing water that are 
not adjacent to or sufficiently connected to a traditionally 
navigable water do not qualify as navigable waters or waters of 
the United States under the CWA.  See 474 U.S. at 134; 531 U.S. 
at 172; 547 U.S. at 739.  In United States v. Riverside Bayview 
Homes, Inc. the Court held that the Army Corps of Engineers’ 
jurisdiction under the CWA extended to wetlands adjacent to 
navigable waters.  474 U.S. at 134.  The Court stressed the 
difficulty of determining when water becomes solid ground in 
approving the breadth of the Corps jurisdiction.  Id. at 132.  
Importantly, the Court focused on Congressional intent limiting 
CWA jurisdiction over navigable waters.  Id. at 136. 
Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v. United States 
Army Corps of Engineers (“SWANCC”) further defined 
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jurisdiction over navigable waters by rejecting the Army Corps of 
Engineer’s assertion of jurisdiction over isolated wetlands based 
on its use as a habitat by migratory birds that cross state lines.  
531 U.S. at 164.  The Court found that when an administrative 
interpretation of a Statute extends to the outer bounds of 
Congressional power, a clear demonstration of Congressional 
intent is required.  Id. at 172.  To extend CWA jurisdiction to 
isolated, non-navigable waters would effectively write navigable 
out of the Statute contrary to the Statute’s legislative intent.  Id. 
at 171. 
Rapanos v. United States concerned two consolidated cases 
(United States v. Rapanos and Carabell v. United States) in which 
four Michigan wetlands located adjacent to ditches or human 
made drains that eventually emptied into navigable waters were 
subject to federal jurisdiction by the EPA and the U.S. Army 
Corps of Engineers.  547 U.S. 715, 729.  Although the Rapanos 
Court did not deliver a majority opinion, the plurality held that 
wetlands not adjacent to traditional interstate navigable waters 
must have a continuous surface connection to such waters so that 
the distinction between waters and wetlands is unclear.  Id. at 
742. 
Justice Kennedy’s concurrence supported a “significant 
nexus” test to determine when jurisdiction could be exerted over a 
wetland not immediately adjacent to a navigable-in-fact water.  
To satisfy Justice Kennedy’s test, a significant nexus between the 
wetland and navigable-in-fact water would be “assessed in terms 
of the [CWA’s] goals and purposes,” including the restoration and 
maintenance of the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of 
the nation’s waters.  Id. at 779.  Justice Kennedy suggested a 
case-by-case analysis for regulation of wetlands adjacent to non-
navigable tributaries of navigable-in-fact waters.  Id. at 782.  
Finally, the dissent would have held that CWA jurisdiction 
applied following either the continuous surface connection or the 
significant nexus test and encouraged lower courts to use either 
test.  Id. at 810.  Under the plurality’s holding, an intermittently 
flowing ditch would not qualify as navigable water, while under 
Justice Kennedy’s concurrence, a ditch, whether intermittent or 
continuous, may support navigable water jurisdiction if a 
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significant nexus between the ditch and a traditionally navigable 
water is determined.  Id. at 736, 803. 
For the plurality, Justice Scalia stressed the plain-meaning 
of the Statute’s words, positing that even when ditches 
continuously hold water, ordinary parlance would describe such a 
water as a river, creek, or stream.  Id. at 736.  When “ditch” is 
invoked, it generally refers to something less than “waters.”  Id.  
Most importantly, under both the plurality and the concurrence, 
an isolated water must be connected to a water that is navigable 
in its own right. 
In the current case, Ditch C-1 is not a navigable water 
because it is not navigable-in-fact and is not adjacent to navigable 
water.  In Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., the Court allowed 
jurisdiction over a wetland that naturally flowed into a navigable 
water so that it was difficult to determine where the navigable 
water ended and the wetland began.  474 U.S. at 132.  
Determining where Ditch C-1 ends and Reedy Creek begins is 
irrelevant since Reedy Creek is not a navigable water.  Ditch C-1 
does not flow into a navigable water, and therefore, the deference 
given in Riverside does not extend to this case. 
Next, the Court’s holding in SWANCC demonstrated that 
jurisdiction under the CWA cannot be extended to the outer 
bounds of Congressional authority without clear authorization 
from Congress.  531 U.S. at 172.  Extending jurisdiction over 
Ditch C-1—a non-navigable, manmade ditch that is not adjacent 
to navigable water—would expand CWA jurisdiction to the point 
of giving navigable no meaning.  Such an expansion cannot be 
sustained without clear support from Congress.  On the contrary, 
Congressional history demonstrates that the CWA was designed 
to protect traditional States rights.  33 U.S.C. § 1251(b). 
Finally, Rapanos does not extend CWA jurisdiction in this 
case.  Since Ditch C-1 ends at Reedy Creek, which is not a 
traditional interstate navigable water, the ditch cannot satisfy 
either the continuous surface connection test or the significant 
nexus test, because the key element of both tests—connection to a 
navigable water—cannot be satisfied.  Even following Justice 
Kennedy’s concurrence, and assuming that Ditch C-1 has a 
significant nexus to Reedy Creek, jurisdiction would still not 
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extend to Ditch C-1 because Reedy Creek is neither a navigable-
in-fact water or a tributary of a navigable water. 
In conclusion, this Court should uphold the lower court’s 
finding that Ditch C-1 does not qualify as navigable water or 
water of the United States under the CWA because Ditch C-1 
does not have a connection to a traditionally navigable water. 
While this section has assumed that Reedy Creek is not a 
navigable water or a water of the United States for purposes of 
the CWA, the next section will demonstrate that under relevant 
case law, Reedy Creek cannot be considered a navigable water or 
a water of the United States. 
V. THIS COURT SHOULD RESERVE THE DISTRICT 
COURT’S RULING THAT REEDY CREEK 
QUALIFIES AS NAVIGABLE WATER OR A WATER 
OF THE UNITED STATES UNDER 33 U.S.C. § 
1362(7), (12) BECAUSE REEDY CREEK IS 
NEITHER A NAVIGABLE-IN-FACT WATER NOR A 
WATER WITH A CONTINUOUS SURFACE 
CONNECTION OR A SIGNIFICANT NEXUS TO A 
NAVIGABLE-IN-FACT WATER. 
As previously discussed, the CWA intends to maintain 
traditional state power over local land use planning, including the 
development and use of water resources.  33 U.S.C. § 1251(b).  
Congress recognized that the sovereignty of the States entitled 
each State to exert control over the restoration, preservation, and 
enhancement of their own water resources.  Id.  Reedy Creek is 
neither navigable-in-fact nor connected to a navigable-in-fact 
water.  To extend federal jurisdiction over waters, such as Reedy 
Creek, would improperly extend the power of the Commerce 
Clause.  As articulated by the SWANCC Court, expansion to the 
outer limits of Commerce Clause authority must be accompanied 
by a clear demonstration of Congressional intent.  531 U.S. at 
172.  This Court should hold that Reedy Creek does not qualify as 
a “navigable water” or a water of the United States because 
interstate waters must be navigable-in-fact or connected to 
navigable-in-fact waters for CWA jurisdiction to apply.  See 
Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 739 (2006); United States 
v. Robison, 505 F.3d 1208, 1222 (11th Cir. 2007); United States v. 
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Moses, 496 F.3d 984, 991 (9th Cir. 2007); United States v. Deaton, 
332 F.3d 698, 706 (4th Cir. 2003). 
Rapanos concerned the connection between wetlands and 
navigable-in-fact waters to determine whether CWA jurisdiction 
applied to the isolated wetlands.  For the plurality, Justice Scalia 
specifically noted the importance of States’ rights to control land 
and water resources and that “waters of the United States” was 
not a clear authorization from Congress to stretch the Commerce 
Clause power to encroach on States’ rights.  547 U.S. at 737-8. 
The plurality concluded that “waters of the United States” means 
“a relatively permanent body of water connected to traditional 
interstate navigable waters.”  Id. at 741.  Thus, if a water is not 
navigable-in-fact, it can only be covered under the CWA if there is 
a connection to a navigable-in-fact water. 
Following Rapanos, the Eleventh Circuit held in Robison that 
CWA jurisdiction can be exerted over a non-navigable creek if 
there is a significant nexus to a navigable-in-fact water.  505 F.3d 
at 1221.  Concluding that Justice Kennedy’s concurrence was 
controlling precedent in Rapanos, the Eleventh Circuit remanded 
the case because the jury instructions concerning “navigable 
waters” did not include “significant nexus.”  Id. at 1222.  
Accordingly, the jury was to decide if the Avondale Creek, a non-
navigable water, caused chemical, physical, or biological effects 
on the Black Warrior River, a navigable-in-fact body of water.  Id.  
Thus, under either the plurality or concurrence in Rapanos, the 
water in question must be connected to a navigable-in-fact water.  
Without that essential element, CWA jurisdiction cannot be 
extended to the water in question. 
Furthermore, the Fourth Circuit held in Deaton that federal 
jurisdiction over navigable waters is derived from the federal 
government’s authority to regulate the channels of interstate 
commerce.  332 F. 3d 698, 706.  The court established the three 
prongs of federal Commerce Clause authority United States v. 
Lopez—the channels of interstate commerce, the 
instrumentalities of interstate commerce, and activities 
substantially related to interstate commerce—before concluding 
that navigable water is situated under the channels prong.  Id. at 
705-6.  The court then likened channels of interstate commerce to 
highways, which move goods from one state to another.  Id. at 
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707.  Therefore, when the federal government exerts Commerce 
Clause power over a water, it must be based on the water’s use as 
a highway of interstate commerce to move goods across state 
lines. 
Similarly, the Ninth Circuit held in Moses that an interstate 
creek qualified as a water of the United States under the CWA 
because it eventually flowed into a navigable-in-fact water.  496 
F.3d at 988.  In this case, the court held the defendant liable for 
attempting to divert Teton Creek without a CWA permit because 
Teton Creek qualified as a water of the United States as a 
tributary to Teton River.  Id.  Although Teton Creek was an 
interstate water, that fact alone was not enough to satisfy CWA 
jurisdiction; the court additionally relied on the connection to a 
navigable-in-fact water. 
In the current case, it is undisputed that Reedy Creek is not 
navigable-in-fact and cannot be made so with reasonable 
improvements.  (R. at 9).  To hold that Reedy Creek is a water of 
the United States would unduly infringe upon the States’ 
traditional rights to control land and water resources, specifically 
addressed in Rapanos.  547 U.S. at 737-8.  Both the plurality and 
the concurrence based jurisdiction over non-navigable water on 
that water’s connection to a navigable-in-fact water.  Id. at 741.  
Reedy Creek is not navigable-in-fact and terminates in Wildman 
Marsh, a wetland that is also not navigable-in-fact.  (R. at 5-6).  
Therefore, Reedy Creek lacks the connection to a traditionally 
navigable water necessary to exert jurisdiction. 
This argument finds further support in Robison, where the 
court concluded that a creek could qualify as a water of the 
United States as a non-navigable tributary if the creek had a 
significant nexus to a navigable-in-fact water.  505 F.3d at 1222.  
Reedy Creek terminates into Wildman Marsh, a wetland that is 
not navigable-in-fact.  (R. at 5).  Although Wildman Marsh is 
used as a habitat by migratory birds, the Court rejected using 
this argument for “waters of the United States” purposes in 
SWANCC.  531 U.S. 159, 174.  The opposing parties’ argument 
for jurisdiction rests on the presumption that since Wildman 
Marsh is located on federal land, it qualifies as a water of the 
United States, making Reedy Creek a tributary of a water of the 
United States.  Although the CWA requires that all branches of 
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the federal government with jurisdiction over any property 
comply with all federal laws, the CWA does not regulate non-
navigable wetlands that do not have a connection to a navigable-
in-fact water.  33 U.S.C. § 1323(a). Wildman Marsh is not 
navigable-in-fact and does not have a continuous surface 
connection or significant nexus to a navigable-in-fact water, 
therefore, Wildman Marsh is not covered by the CWA.  Thus, 
Wildman Marsh is not governed by CWA requirements. 
The opposing parties next argue that Reedy Creek is 
necessary for interstate travel, because Reedy Creek is used as a 
water supply for a service area supporting interstate travelers 
and irrigation for agricultural purposes.  (R. at 5).  However, this 
argument supports Commerce Clause jurisdiction based on Reedy 
Creek’s affect on interstate commerce, rather than Reedy Creek’s 
use as a channel of interstate commerce.  The Fourth Circuit held 
that Commerce Clause jurisdiction over navigable waters is based 
on the government’s authority to regulate the channels of 
interstate commerce.  332 F. 3d 698, 706.  Reedy Creek is not 
used to move goods in interstate commerce, which means 
Commerce Clause jurisdiction does not extend to Reedy Creek. 
Moreover, the Rapanos Court’s focus on traditional, 
interstate navigable waters to limit federal regulation clearly 
demonstrates how authority under the Commerce Clause may 
only be used in connection to channels of interstate commerce.  
547 U.S. 715, 739.  The opposing parties point to United States v. 
Earth Science, in which an interstate creek with uses similar to 
Reedy Creek was included under CWA jurisdiction.  599 F.2d 368, 
375 (10th Cir. 1979); (R. at 10).  Earth Science is a pre-Rapanos 
case that improperly focuses on an interstate creek’s affects on 
interstate commerce instead of an interstate creek’s use as a 
channel of interstate commerce.  Earth Science is not controlling 
precedent on this issue. 
Without use as a channel in interstate commerce, jurisdiction 
over Reedy Creek rests on the fact that the Creek crosses state 
lines; but the extension of jurisdiction over any water that crosses 
state lines is an impermissible expansion of federal authority.  In 
United States v. Moses, the Ninth Circuit held that an interstate 
creek was a water of the United States because the creek was a 
tributary to a navigable-in-fact water.  496 F.3d at 988.  While in 
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this case, Reedy Creek is an interstate water, Reedy Creek is not 
a tributary to a navigable-in-fact water.  This Court should not 
uphold EPA regulation that defines “waters of the United States” 
as “all interstate waters” because it is an abuse of Commerce 
Clause power.  40 C.F.R. 122.2 (2011). 
Courts generally grant Chevron deference to an agency for 
legislative rules, such as EPA’s definition of “waters of the United 
States.”  Chevron v. Natural Resource Defense Council, 467 U.S. 
837 (1984).  Chevron deference requires the courts to answer two 
questions: (1) Whether Congressional intent of a statute is clear; 
and (2) If the statute is ambiguous, whether the agency’s 
interpretation was reasonable or permissible.  Id. at 842-3.  In 
this case, “navigable water,” defined as “all waters of the United 
States, including the territorial seas” is unquestionably 
ambiguous.  33 U.S.C. § 1362(7).  Therefore, this Court must 
move to the second question under Chevron: whether the agency’s 
interpretation that “navigable water” means any interstate water 
is a reasonable interpretation of the Statute.  This Court should 
find that EPA’s interpretation is unreasonable.  Non-navigable 
waters—even interstate waters—must have a connection to 
navigable-in-fact waters for federal jurisdiction to apply.  
Congress specifically limited the EPA and Army Corps of 
Engineer’s jurisdictional power by limiting authority to navigable 
waters.  Id. 
To accept EPA interpretation of navigable water to include 
all interstate water, whether that water is isolated from 
navigable-in-fact water or not, would deprive “navigable” of all 
meaning.  The Supreme Court has noted on numerous occasions 
that although the definition of navigable is expanded under the 
CWA, the term must be given some effect.  See United States v. 
Rapanos, 547 U.S. 715, 776 (Kennedy, J. concurrence); Solid 
Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v United States Army 
Corps of Engineers, 531 U.S. 159, 172; and United States v. 
Riverside Bayside Homes, Inc. 474 U.S. 121, 133 (acknowledging 
that while “navigable” is of limited import, jurisdiction was based 
on significant nexus to navigable water). 
In conclusion, Reedy Creek is neither navigable-in-fact nor 
connected to a navigable-in-fact water.  Furthermore, jurisdiction 
over Reedy Creek cannot be established under the Commerce 
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Clause because Reedy Creek is not used as a channel of interstate 
commerce.  Accordingly, this Court should find that Reedy Creek 
does not qualify as a navigable water or water of the United 
States under the CWA. 
 
VI.  SHOULD THIS COURT FIND THAT REEDY 
CREEK QUALIFIES AS A NAVIGABLE WATER, IT 
SHOULD THEN UPHOLD THE DISTRICT 
COURT’S RULING HOLDING BONHOMME 
LIABLE FOR DISCHARGING A POLLUTANT 
INTO A NAVIGABLE WATER UNDER 33 U.S.C. § 
1311(A) BECAUSE BONHOMME IS THE OWNER-
IN-FACT OF THE POLLUTANT’S POINT SOURCE. 
Bonhomme owns a point source from which arsenic, a known 
pollutant, is discharged into Reedy Creek and if this Court 
establishes Reedy Creek as a navigable water, Bonhomme is in 
violation of the CWA for his culvert’s release of contaminants into 
it.  (R. at 5).  To successfully establish a claim under this 
provision of the CWA a plaintiff must allege facts demonstrating 
that the opposing party discharged pollutants into a navigable 
water without a proper permit.  33 U.S.C. § 1311(a)(1).  As 
previously established, the “discharge of a pollutant” is defined as 
“any addition of any pollutant to navigable waters from a point 
source.”  33 U.S.C. § 1362(12).  The Statute defines point source” 
as “any discernible, confined and discrete conveyance . . . from 
which pollutants are or may be discharged.”  33 U.S.C. § 
1362(14).  Bonhomme owns a culvert from which arsenic, a 
known pollutant, is discharged into Reedy Creek.  R. at 5.  
Culverts are judicially recognized as point sources under the 
CWA.  Dague v. Burlington 935 F.2d 1343, 1354-55 (2d Cir. 1991), 
rev’d on other grounds, 505 U.S. 557 (1992).  It logically follows 
that if this Court establishes Reedy Creek as a navigable water 
Bonhomme is in violation of the CWA for his culvert’s release of 
pollutants into Reedy Creek. 
Bonhomme’s attempt to escape liability owing to Maleau’s 
alleged upstream discharge of arsenic via the waste piles on his 
Lincoln County property is unfounded.  As the district court aptly 
notes after examining the plain language of the Statute, the CWA 
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definitions of “discharge” and “addition” do not include a 
causation element.  (R. at 9).  An examination of relevant case 
law reveals that courts likewise do not interpret it as such.  The 
Supreme Court held that pollutant discharge includes point 
sources that themselves do not generate impurities.  S. Florida 
Water Mgt. Dist. v. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians, 541 U.S. 95, 105 
(2004) (“Tellingly, the examples of ‘point sources’ listed by the 
[CWA] include pipes, ditches, tunnels, and conduits, objects that 
do not themselves generate pollutants but merely transport 
them”.)  Therefore, the fact that Bonhomme’s culvert does not 
produce arsenic is irrelevant to establishing his liability under 
the CWA.  The determinant factor is its discharge into Reedy 
Creek, provided this Court finds that Reedy Creek constitutes a 
navigable water under the Statute. 
 Sierra Club v. El Paso Gold Mines, Inc. similarly 
established that point source owners could be liable for the 
discharge of pollutants into navigable waters occurring on their 
land, whether or not their actions caused said discharge.  421 
F.3d 1133, 1144 (10th Cir. 2005).  In that case a property owner 
violated the CWA though the he did own or operate the business 
generating the pollution into the navigable stream.  The court 
held that the Statute intended for successive owners of point 
sources to assume responsibility for activity on his or her 
property regardless of personal action.  Id.  In its decision, the 
Tenth Circuit established that “if you own the leaky faucet you 
are responsible for the drips.”  Id. at 1145.  Further support for 
this interpretation is found in the regulations promulgated by 
EPA pursuant to the CWA, which define the phrase “addition of 
any pollutant” as “surface runoff which is collected or channeled 
by man; discharges through pipes, sewers, or other conveyances 
owned by a . . . person which do not lead to a treatment works; 
and discharges through pipes, sewers, or other conveyances, 
leading into privately owned treatment works.”  Id.; 40 C.F.R. § 
122.2; see also EPA Notice, 55 Fed.Reg. 35248–01 (Aug. 28, 1990) 
(stating drainage from abandoned mines can be point source 
pollution where the owner can be identified; otherwise, it is 
nonpoint source pollution).  As the Tenth Circuit notes, this 
regulation, though not a substitution for statutory language 
nevertheless bolsters the assertion that ownership of a point 
source triggers liability.  El Paso, 421 F.3d at 1144. 
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Statutory language and relevant case law therefore support 
Maleau’s assertion that, assuming Reedy Creek is deemed a 
navigable water by this Court, Bonhomme violates the CWA by 
discharging arsenic into it through the culvert on his property.  
The district court’s ruling on this issue should therefore be 
upheld. 
 
CONCLUSION 
This Court should not entertain Bonhomme’s citizen suit 
under the CWA, because Bonhomme is neither the real party in 
interest nor a citizen for the purposes of the Statute. Should this 
Court permit standing, Maleau should still not be held liable for 
arsenic discovered in Ditch C-1 and Reedy Creek.  Maleau’s waste 
piles do not constitute point sources for the purposes of the CWA 
and are thus not subject to CWA regulation.  Further, neither 
Ditch C-1 nor Reedy Creek qualify as navigable waters or waters 
of the United States under the CWA. Consequently, Maleau 
cannot be held liable under a federal statute that does not grant 
federal jurisdiction over the waters in question.  Finally, even if 
this Court expands federal jurisdiction over Reedy Creek, then 
Bonhomme is liable for the discharge of a pollutant from a point 
source into a navigable water.  Accordingly, this Court should 
dismiss the actions against Maleau. 
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